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Introduction
In this paper we introduce the discontinuous universal feedback for the problem of Nash equilibrium in two person non-zero sum differential game. This approach is close to the extremal shift rule suggested by N.N. Krasovskii and A.I. Subbotin for the zero-sum differential games. The extremal shift rule was suggested in [1] to prove the existence of value function. The value function of zero sum differential game is the viscosity solution of corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The universal feedback synthesis is based on the properties of value function and the definition of viscosity solutions. N.N. Krasovskii designed the universal feedback ε-strategies [2] . His scheme use the minimization of the value function of the game in ε-neighborhood. A.I. Subbotin introduced the universal feedback using the notion of quasigradient [3] , [4] . In the paper of F. H. Clarke, Yu. S. Ledyaev, and A. I. Subbotin [5] the aiming in the direction of proximal subgradients of the value function was studied. Constructed strategy is universal also.
The problem of Nash equilibrium in the differential game is connected with the Cauchy problem for the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations [6] . In the general case the Hamiltonians are discontinuous. If the smooth solution of Cauchy problem exists and the controls of players are continuous then there exists universal feedback Nash equilibrium. If the solutions doesn't exist or it isn't smooth then the situation becomes more complicated. A particular case when the universal feedback Nash equilibrium exists were considered by P.
Cardaliaguet and S. Plaskacz [7] . The approach based on the solution of the system of conservation laws is developed by A. Bressan and W. Shen [8] , [9] . They study one dimensional games under condition of hyperbolicity and design the universal feedback strategies.
In this paper we consider the general case of finite horizon non-zero sum differential game. We assume that there exist functions satisfying some conditions analogous to the infinitesimal conditions on value function in zero sum differential games [4] , [5] . Under this assumption we prove the existence of universal feedback Nash equilibrium.
Definitions and Designations
We consider the doubly controlled systeṁ
Here u and v are controls of the Player I and the Player II respectively. The purposes of the Players are nonantagonistic. The Player I wants to maximize the functional
the Player II wants to maximize the functional
We assume that the sets P and Q are compacts, the function f , σ 1 and σ 2 are continuous, moreover f , g 1 and g 2 are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the phase variable, and satisfy the sublinear growth condition with respect to x.
We use the discontinuous feedback control scheme first suggested by N.N. Krasovskii for zero-sum differential games. We consider the two cases:
• the Players choose feedback strategies and make consistent the corrective moments;
• one of the Players deviates.
Feedback strategy of the Player I is a function U (t, x) with values in P , feedback strategy of the Player II is a function V (t, x) with the values in Q.
Let us consider the first case. We assume that the Player I chooses the strategy U , the Player II chooses the strategy V . Let (t * , x * ) be an initial position. Suppose that the Players choose the partion of time segment [t * , ϑ 0 ] ∆ = {τ k } m k=1 . Further let d(∆) denote the fineness of partition ∆. Let x c [·, t * , x * , U, V, ∆] be an unique solution of the problem
The value of cost functional of i-th Player in this case is equal to
Now we suppose that the Player II chooses a measurable control v [·] . Let
be an unique solution of the problem
The value of cost functional of Player II in this case is equal to
In the same way the case when the Player II deviates is considered. Denote the motion generated by the strategy of the Player II and the control of the Player I by
The value of cost functional of Player I in this case is equal to
Let us introduce the following values:
We say that the family of strategies is universal feedback Nash equilibrium on compact
In this paper we develop the approach based on system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. The definition of Hamiltonians involves the Nash equilibrium in a static game. This game is an analog of a small game used in the theory of zero-sum games [1] .
Define for (t,
, q ∈ R n and consider the static games
Denote the set of Nash equilibriums of game (2) by NE(t, x, p, q). Further we assume that for all (t, x) ∈ [t 0 , ϑ 0 ] × R n , p, q ∈ R n the set NE(t, x, p, q) is nonempty.
Remark 1. If the sets
The pair of values (χ 1 (t, x, p, q, u * , v * ), χ 2 (t, x, p, q, u * , v * )) for (u * , v * ) ∈ NE(t, x, p, q) is an analog of Hamiltonian.
Elements of Proximal Calculus
In this section we follow the definitions from [5] . Let φ :
is said to be a proximal subgradient at the position (t, x), if there exists a constant σ − > 0 such that for (t ′ , x ′ ) sufficiently close to (t, x) the following inequality holds
Analogously, the vector (ζ
is said to be a proximal supergradient at the position (t, x), if there exists a constant σ + > 0 such that for (t ′ , x ′ ) sufficiently close to (t, x) the following inequality holds
Denote the set of all proximal subgradients by ∂ − P φ(t, x), the set of all proximal supergradients by ∂
Let us introduce the following transformation of φ:
Let (τ α , y α ) maximize the right hand of (4) for the fixed position (t,
In the same way we define the following transformation of the function φ
Let (τ α , y α ) minimize the right hand of (6). Denote
Lemmas 1-5 formulated below are analogs of lemmas 3.1-3.5 of [5] . Therefore lemmas 1-5 are not proved here. In lemmas 1-5 we assume that the position (t, x) ∈ D is fixed, (τ α , y α ) maximizes the right hand of (4), and (τ α , y α ) minimizes the right hand of (4).
Lemma 2. The following estimates are valid
Lemma 3. The following inequalities hold
Here ω φ is a modulus of continuity of the function φ on D 1 .
Following [5] we consider the sets
Lemma 4. Let α ∈ (0, 1/C 2 ). Then one of the following statements are fulfilled:
Analogously, one of the following statements is fulfilled:
Lemma 5. For any δ > 0 and f ∈ R n the following inequalities hold
Main result
Consider the functions (t, x, p, q) → u * (t, x, p, q), (t, x, p, q) → v * (t, x, p, q) such that (u * (t, x, p, q), v * (t, x, p, q)) ∈ NE(t, x, p, q). Put
Theorem. Suppose that there exist functions ϕ(t, x), ψ(t, x), and ω(t, x, d) with properties:
Then the pair of strategies
are defined by formula (5) at the position (t, x) for the functions ϕ and ψ respectively. Moreover lim inf
Corollary. 
Then the conclusion of the Theorem holds.
Proof of the Theorem. Let us consider the compact D 0 . Denote by D the reachable set from D 0 . Also we assume that D 1 is defined by (3) .
Put
Let (t * , x * ) ∈ D 0 be an initial position. Let Ξ = {ξ j } r j=0 be a partition of the interval [t * , ϑ 0 ]. Further we will consider a motion of the system
Let a constant C 3 be define by the rule
Also define
Consider the following moduli of continuity on D 1 :
First we consider the case then the Player I deviates. We prove that for any control of the Player I u[·], the following inequality is valid
where lim α→0 lim δ→0 η(α, δ) = 0.
In this case we have
Then
We obtain the inequality
Now let j < l. Denotef 
By lemma 5 we obtain that
By the choice of v j we have that
It follows from the properties (a
and condition 6 of the Theorem that
By the condition 1 of the Theorem we have that γ(α) → 0, as α → 0. From the inequalities (13), (14) and (15) it follows that
Using the estimate (16) for j = 0, l − 1 we conclude that
using the inequality (12) we have that
we obtain the estimate (11). Now let us consider the case when the Player I and Player II use the strategies U α and
Let l be a minimal number such that (
Estimating the variation of the function ϕ we have that As to the rest we use the notations introduced above. By lemma 5 we obtain that
It follows from the definition of the strategies U α , V α and the elements u j , v j that
By the lemma 2 we have that
The condition 4 of the Theorem yields that a + + H(t, x, p + , q + ) ≥ −ω(t, x, C 2 α).
Using the function γ(·) we have
From this and the inequality (18) it follows that
